| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,630,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥2,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000)
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| Research Abstract |
The biometrics rapidly prevails in society like this. In these examples, the biometric systems are applied in closed environments, however, there are fervent social demands about the biometric systems applied to the authentication on internet services such as internet banking, electrical government, approval in company, etc.
On the other hands, the biometric system causes some privacy issues. That is, in some cases, significant privacy information like a medical history is compromised from the biometric information which is including biometric raw data acquired from biometric sensor devices, the feature information extracted from the corresponding biometric raw data, and enrolled templates.
Therefore, we investigate novel biometric authentication framework and template database in the viewpoint of privacy protection.
1. One-Time Biometric Authentication
We proposed a novel protection technique for the information of biometric authentication, especially the feature information and the templ
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ates. The point of our proposal is that the extracted features and the enrolled templates are transformed by one-time transformation that is generated in each authentication. The transformed features and templates travel through insecure communication line like the internet, and they are used in matching process. This technique causes security against eavesdropping and replay attacks on the internet, because the transmitted feature information and the templates are different every time.
2. Secure Distributed Storage Scheme in Biometric Template Database
We mentioned the each biometric template consists of multiple elements like a fingerprint minutiae. We proposed a distributed storage scheme of the elements of the templates by scrambling indices of storage address with hash table for each enrolled person. The indices are determined from the hash value of combination of binary data of the elements of the enrolled template, and pseudo random number with a seed value based on the owner's individual data. In this solution, the adjacent data in the storage device are not from a unique person's template. Therefore, no adversary reconstructs each enrolled person's template, unless the map of the storage address is stolen. In addition, this procedure has an effect on disturbance of the forgery.
3. Biometric Template Database by using Mutual Correlation of Enrolled Templates
We supposed the biometric templates have mutual correlation between the registrants on the database. We proposed the storage scheme for the biometric database which separates the templates to average data of the all enrolled templates. The average data and the difference data are stored separably. The average data are denoted by average images of all enrolled images, or indices of vector quantization for vector form data. Because reconstruction of the templates requires both the average data and the difference data, if attacker obtains no information of the average data this scheme is able to prevents malicious manipulation against the enrolled templates. Less
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