| Project/Area Number |
18530236
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
HOSOE Moriki Kyushu University, Faculty of Economics, Professor (20140832)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MIURA Isao Kyushu University, Faculty of Economics, Professor (30239173)
HORI Nobuaki Kyushu University, Faculty of Economics, Associate Professor (50304720)
KANAZAKI Masayuki Kyushu Sangyo University, Faculty of Economics, Assistant Professor (50403944)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2006 – 2007
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2007)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,790,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Keywords | Political Governance / Comparative Analysis / Game Analysis / 政治的ガバンス |
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| Research Abstract |
In this research we made modeling the structures of political governance as games among political players , made some comparative analysis of the structures, and examined the problem of economic efficiency in various kinds of political phases. Hosoe "Regional Integration and Separation with Rent Seeking" showed how much bias rent seeking activity by Politicians brings with respect to efficient integration of two regions. And in Hosoe " Comparative Analysis of Political Governance Structures between Politicians and Bureaucrats ," we found that the politicians allocate the socially excess authority to themselves when they can decide authority allocation, and the dominant bureaucrats system has the smallest delegation of the authority to politicians compared to any other system. In Kanazaki "Election and Special Interest Group in Integration of Local Government " we argued about the influences on lobbing activity by special interest groups on integration of two local governments and introduced the condition of excess integration and under integration. In Miura "Soft Budget and Spillover Effect " , we examined, about soft budget problem for government and the spillover effect of public goods on two regions. As a result, it was shown that there is a possibility that excess supply of public goods decreases the soft budget effect. Finally in Miura "General Evaluation Method of Public Bidding ", we made the comparative analysis of procurement mechanism of public goods and made a new design of a general evaluation method for public bidding and sought the optical mechanism in the framework of power game among politicians and interest groups.
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