| Project/Area Number |
18K01300
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 05040:Social law-related
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2018-04-01 – 2023-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2022)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2020: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | algorithmic collusion / cartel / Uber / algorithmic auditing / concerted practice / online retail / digital economy / price setting / hub-and-spoke conspiracy / Amazon / online grocery markets / resale price maintenance / hub-and-spoke collusion / opaqueness / tranparency / Japan / Antimonopoly Law / JFTC / hub-and-spoke cartel / cartel facilitator / horizontal shareholding / common shareholding / kansei dango / vertical cartel / Asian competition / compliance / type I and II errors / messenger model / hub and spoke model / signaling model / digital eye model / black box testing / price fixing / tacit collusion / alternative regulation |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The research has responded to the question of whether competition law can respond to algorithmic collusion. The answer to this question depends on 1) the conceptualization of the competition law and 2) the correct understanding of the operation of an algorithm. Competition laws, that recognize concerted practices without adding any other requirement and impose a responsibility to comply with the law, can be applied to any kind of algorithmic collusion. If a competition law is not applicable to cartel facilitators, many types of algorithmic collusion can escape the law. Auditing algorithms is an alternative enforcement tool, but too complex and time consuming. The research therefore suggests to regulate the risk of algorithms operating with transparent information, which is information readily available to everyone. Algorithms operating on opaque information pose less risk for algorithmic collusion, unless information is explicitly shared or stolen.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
Competition laws with broad and flexible prohibitions are more likely to appropriately deal with algorithmic collusion. The Japanese competition law does not fit this finding. Furthermore, collusion by algorithms is likely on online retail platforms. Regulating this risk is better than punishing.
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