Dynamic incentive and control algorithm for the development of the next-generation urban infrastructure systems

• Project/Area Number: 18K13781
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Review Section: Basic Section 21040:Control and system engineering-related
• Research Institution: Waseda University
• Principal Investigator: Wasa Yasuaki 早稲田大学, 理工学術院, 講師(任期付) (60793560)
• Project Period (FY): 2018-04-01 – 2021-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2020)
• Budget Amount: ¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000); Fiscal Year 2020: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000); Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000); Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
• Keywords: 制御工学 / 動的インセンティブ設計 / ゲーム理論 / 契約理論 / 都市インフラシステム

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This research project aims at developing fundamental technologies for next-generation urban infrastructure systems. This project has developed a new dynamic incentive mechanism merging contract theory, optimal control theory and game theory to lead the individually optimal state into a global optimizer. Moreover, the proposed mechanism is applied to the optimal design for the strategic bidding problem of the agents' private model information under moral hazard. The effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is also demonstrated via simulations on dynamic power networks and traffic systems.

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

多様な利害関係を調整するメカニズムの構築は、電力市場の文脈で国内外問わず精力的に取り組まれ、超スマート社会の実現においても重要な技術課題である。関連研究の多くは特定のメカニズムに対する性能解析を重視しているが、どのメカニズムがどのような意味で最適であるか、という設計問題に対する研究は不十分であった。本研究課題では、設計問題の最適解を導出する基盤理論を系統的手法で明らかにした。開発した解析・設計方法は電力や交通を含む超スマート社会の多様な実運用方策に対して、理論的性能保証の提供による貢献が期待できる。

Research Products

• [Int'l Joint Research] The University of Texas at Austin(米国)
• [Journal Article] Optimal agency contract for incentive and control under moral hazard in dynamic electric power networks (2019)
  • Author(s): Wasa Yasuaki、Hirata Kenji、Uchida Kenko
  • Journal Title: IET Smart Grid Volume: 2 Issue: 4 Pages: 594-601
  • DOI: 10.1049/iet-stg.2018.0256
  • Peer Reviewed / Open Access
• [Presentation] Strategic Bidding of Private Information for Dynamic LQ Networks under Moral Hazard (2020)
  • Author(s): Yasuaki Wasa, Kenko Uchida
  • Organizer: 21st IFAC World Congress
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Path Integral Control for Stochastic Dynamic Traffic Routing Problems (2020)
  • Author(s): Michael Hibbard, Yasuaki Wasa, Takashi Tanaka
  • Organizer: 59th Conference on Decision and Control
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] プリンシパルエージェント型LQ問題における私的情報の戦略的入札と社会厚生への影響 (2020)
  • Author(s): 和佐泰明、内田健康
  • Organizer: SICE 第7回 制御部門マルチシンポジウム
• [Presentation] Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks (2019)
  • Author(s): Yasuaki Wasa、Toshiyuki Murao、Takashi Tanaka、Kenko Uchida
  • Organizer: 17th European Control Conference
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Optimal Dynamic Incentive and Control Contract among Principal and Agents with Moral Hazard and Long-Term Average Reward (2019)
  • Author(s): Yasuaki Wasa、Kenko Uchida
  • Organizer: 2019 12th Asian Control Conference
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] 都市部高速道路上の交通流適正化のための車線変更ミクロモデルとインセンティブ設計の提案 (2019)
  • Author(s): 山岡実夢，和佐泰明，内田健康
  • Organizer: SICE 第6回 制御部門マルチシンポジウム
• [Presentation] 契約理論に基づく動的電力ネットワークの最適制御とアンシラリーサービスの分析 (2018)
  • Author(s): 中島知己，和佐泰明，内田健康
  • Organizer: 第61回自動制御連合講演会
• [Book] Economically Enabled Energy Management: Interplay between control engineering and economics (2020)
  • Author(s): Yasuaki Wasa, Toshiyuki Murao, Ken-Ichi Akao
  • Total Pages: 341
  • Publisher: Springer Nature
  • ISBN: 9789811535758
• [Remarks] 早稲田大学理工学術院和佐泰明研究室ホームページ
  • URL: http://www.aoni.waseda.jp/wasa/index.html