Auction Design in Behavioral Economics-Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Markets and Human Nature.
| Project/Area Number |
19330041
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Shinshu University |
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Principal Investigator |
NISHIMURA Naoko Shinshu University, 経済学部, 教授 (30218200)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SAIJO Tatsuyoshi 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (20205628)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2010
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥12,480,000 (Direct Cost: ¥9,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,880,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
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| Keywords | オークション / ゲーム理論 / 制度設計 / 社会的選好 / スパイト / 実験 / 実験経済学 / 経済理論 / 互恵性 / 行動経済学 |
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| Research Abstract |
There are four basic auction formats which are known to generate the equivalent expected revenue. This revenue equivalence, however, has not been supported by laboratory experiments. We propose to solve this anomaly by introducing the possibility of buyers being reciprocally spiteful. We show that in the face of the reciprocal buyers, spiteful buyer can not make a bold overbid so that the resulted equilibrium set is efficient and much smaller with lower prices compared to the case of conventional model with self-regarding buyers. In our model, we can rank these four auction formats in terms of their performance, which is consistent with their usage frequency.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(37 results)
