On theory of the collective choice and the mechanism design including the voting system with some applications to problems of the collective decision making of shareholders
Project/Area Number |
19530162
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Waseda University |
Principal Investigator |
SASAKI Hiroo Waseda University, 商学学術院, 教授 (30196175)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
|
Keywords | ミクロ経済学 / ゲーム理論 / 社会選択 / メカニズムデザイン / 投票力指数 / 次善の効率性 / 戦略的操作不可能性 / 拒否権 / 経済制度 / 経済理論 / 単峰的選好 / 投票 / 効率性 / 公平性 |
Research Abstract |
In this research project, we studied the mechanism design of resource allocation mechanisms from several different points of view when the price mechanism does not necessarily work well. If one cannot use the market mechanism for allocating resources, economic agents should report information on their own preferences to a coordinator (e.g., the government) of the allocation, and the coordinator should aggregate the information and perform the allocation according to a predetermined allocation rule. The voting system is a typical example of such an aggregation rule. We investigated and evaluated several resource allocation mechanisms including the voting mechanism.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(8 results)