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On theory of the collective choice and the mechanism design including the voting system with some applications to problems of the collective decision making of shareholders

Research Project

Project/Area Number 19530162
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Section一般
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionWaseda University

Principal Investigator

SASAKI Hiroo  Waseda University, 商学学術院, 教授 (30196175)

Project Period (FY) 2007 – 2009
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
Budget Amount *help
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Keywordsミクロ経済学 / ゲーム理論 / 社会選択 / メカニズムデザイン / 投票力指数 / 次善の効率性 / 戦略的操作不可能性 / 拒否権 / 経済制度 / 経済理論 / 単峰的選好 / 投票 / 効率性 / 公平性
Research Abstract

In this research project, we studied the mechanism design of resource allocation mechanisms from several different points of view when the price mechanism does not necessarily work well. If one cannot use the market mechanism for allocating resources, economic agents should report information on their own preferences to a coordinator (e.g., the government) of the allocation, and the coordinator should aggregate the information and perform the allocation according to a predetermined allocation rule. The voting system is a typical example of such an aggregation rule. We investigated and evaluated several resource allocation mechanisms including the voting mechanism.

Report

(4 results)
  • 2009 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2008 Annual Research Report
  • 2007 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (8 results)

All 2009 2008

All Journal Article (5 results) Presentation (3 results)

  • [Journal Article] 特集にあたって2009

    • Author(s)
      佐々木宏夫
    • Journal Title

      『オペレーションズ・リサーチ』(日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会学会誌) 8月号

      Pages: 450-451

    • NAID

      110007340242

    • Related Report
      2009 Final Research Report
  • [Journal Article] マッチング理論とその応用2009

    • Author(s)
      佐々木宏夫
    • Journal Title

      『オペレーションズ・リサーチ』(日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会学会誌) 8月号

      Pages: 478-484

    • NAID

      110007340232

    • Related Report
      2009 Final Research Report
  • [Journal Article] マッチング理論とその応用2009

    • Author(s)
      佐々木宏夫
    • Journal Title

      オペレーションズ・リサーチ(日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会学会誌) 54

      Pages: 478-484

    • NAID

      110007340232

    • Related Report
      2009 Annual Research Report
  • [Journal Article] 非合理に見える選択行動の合理性について2008

    • Author(s)
      佐々木宏夫・佐藤歩
    • Journal Title

      産業経営(早稲田大学産業経営研究所) 第43号

      Pages: 35-56

    • NAID

      120004970037

    • Related Report
      2009 Final Research Report
  • [Journal Article] 非合理に見える選択行動の合理性について2008

    • Author(s)
      佐々木宏夫, 佐藤歩
    • Journal Title

      産業経営 43

      Pages: 35-56

    • NAID

      120004970037

    • Related Report
      2008 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Second Best Efficiency of Allocation Rules : Strategy-proofness and Single-peaked Preferences with Multiple Commodities2009

    • Author(s)
      佐々木宏夫・阿武秀和
    • Organizer
      RIEBセミナー
    • Place of Presentation
      神戸大学経済経営研究所
    • Year and Date
      2009-09-18
    • Related Report
      2009 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] Equity and efficiency : A Method of Finding All Envy-Free and Efficient Allocations When Preferences are Single-peaked2008

    • Author(s)
      Hidekazu Anno, Hiroo Sasaki
    • Organizer
      The 9th International Meetingof the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
    • Year and Date
      2008-06-22
    • Related Report
      2009 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] Equity and Efficiency : A Method of Finding All Envy-free and Efficient Allocations When Preferences are Single-peaked.2008

    • Author(s)
      Hidekazu Anno, Hiroo Sasaki
    • Organizer
      9 th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      Concordia University, Canada
    • Year and Date
      2008-06-22
    • Related Report
      2008 Annual Research Report

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Published: 2007-04-01   Modified: 2016-04-21  

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