Political Economy of Fiscal Information and Its Feedback Effects
| Project/Area Number |
19530267
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology |
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Principal Investigator |
KONISHI Hideki Tokyo Institute of Technology, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (50225471)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | 公共経済学 / 政治経済学 / 集権と分権 / ヤードスティック競争 / キャリア・コンサーンズ / シグナル抽出問題 / 決算審査 / 予算の透明化 / 不完備情報ゲーム / 偽装された所得移転 / 財政再建 / 公共選択 / 地方分権 / 会計検査 / 監査委員制度 / 地方自治体の監査 |
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| Research Abstract |
Releasing fiscal information of the governments has feedback effects on their incentives and affects their behaviors and policy choices through changing the behaviors or expectations of other political actors such as voters and interest groups. In this study, we mainly examined the signaling effects of the composition of fiscal adjustments, i.e., the choice between spending cuts or tax increases, and the competition among local governments which are motivated with career-concerns and relative performance evaluation to show the efficiency-enhancing properties of transparent budget and decentralization.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(21 results)
