| Project/Area Number |
19730178
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Hiroshima University |
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Principal Investigator |
OUCHIDA Yasunori Hiroshima University, 大学院・社会科学研究科, 准教授 (40321517)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
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| Keywords | 環境R&D / 寡占市場 / 競争政策 / 投資 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research examined environmental R&D under some environmental regulatory instruments. This study revealed the following; (1) Under time-consistent emission tax, RJV cartelization generates the highest profits. On other hand, RJV cartelization is socially desirable when the number of firm is small, or the efficiency of environmental R&D cost is high. Furthermore, the first-best environmental R&D efforts can be achieved in case of cooperative environmental R&D. (2)Under up-stream emission trading in oil-poor country, a strict initial allocation policy of emission permits has no energy-saving effects in both competitive and monopolistic market.
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