Does market discipline work in Japan?
| Project/Area Number |
19730222
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Josai University |
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Principal Investigator |
ASAI Yoshihiro Josai University, 現代政策学部・社会経済システム学科, 助教 (60433645)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
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| Keywords | 市場規律 / 買収防衛策 / 株主提案 / 敵対的買収 / 相互会社 / 格付け / 郵政民営化 / コーポレートガバナンス / 国営銀行 |
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| Research Abstract |
This study investigates how market discipline works in the Japanese financial systems. We obtain the following results. First, the developments of disclosure system enable outsiders to evaluate firms. Second, mutual life insurers are less efficient than stock life insurers. Third, postal saving bank privatization improves their efficiency. Fourth, shareholder proposals by institutional investors discipline corporate managers. Fifth, antitakeover amendments are evaluated as positive when Keiretsu companies adopt them.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(27 results)
