| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Research Abstract |
We conduct theoretical analysis of the model of repeated games where sufficient conditions for a folk theorem (a general efficiency result) fail. Mainly in the model of partnerships under imperfect public monitoring and the model of cartel s with a small discount factor, we characterize the equilibrium which is most efficient in the sense of maximizing the players’ total payoffs. We also formulate a model of repeated games where monitoring is part of a player’s decision making, and present sufficient conditions for existence of cooperative equilibria which provide proper incentives about monitoring.
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