Strategy for cooperation and free-riding in a dynamic contribution game
| Project/Area Number |
20530156
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
MIYAGAWA Eiichi (MIYAGAWA Eiichih) 神戸大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (10467673)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 公共財 / ミクロ経済学 / 繰り返しゲーム / 観察費用 / 両側不確実 / 数値計算 / 片側不確実 |
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| Research Abstract |
This project studied a game where two individuals alternate in making contributions to a public good until their total cumulative contributions reach a required level. Unlike existing studies, we considered the case where individuals do not have complete information about the total amount the other individual is willing to pay for the public good. We succeeded in finding a game-theoretic equilibrium. When the required level of contributions is relatively small, we proved that no other equilibrium exists. We found that, in the equilibrium, the public good is completed only gradually. Completion may take a very long time even when the required level of contributions is small.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(14 results)
