| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This project studied a game where two individuals alternate in making contributions to a public good until their total cumulative contributions reach a required level. Unlike existing studies, we considered the case where individuals do not have complete information about the total amount the other individual is willing to pay for the public good. We succeeded in finding a game-theoretic equilibrium. When the required level of contributions is relatively small, we proved that no other equilibrium exists. We found that, in the equilibrium, the public good is completed only gradually. Completion may take a very long time even when the required level of contributions is small.
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