Stochastic evolution and equilibrium selection in n-person asymmetric coordination games
| Project/Area Number |
20530161
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Nihon University |
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Principal Investigator |
MARUTA Toshimasa Nihon University, 大学院・総合科学研究科, 教授 (60295730)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
OKADA Akira 一橋大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (90152298)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2010
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 協調ゲーム / 均衡選択 / 確率進化 / 進化ゲーム理論 / グーム理論 / ナッシュ均衡 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
Given a game with multiple equilibria, the equilibrium selection problem asks : Which equilibrium is, if any, most "stable"? To answer the question, an equilibrium selection model singles out an equilibrium by specifying and investigating the strategy adjustment process through which the players play the game. Employing the stochastic evolution approach, we examine the equilibrium selection problem in many-person games. In a sharp contrast to the previously known results for two-person games, we find that the selection outcome is very sensitive to the strategy adjustment process. In particular, the selection outcome under the adaptive play or the multi-population random matching may be radically different from that under the single population random matching.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(7 results)
