Research on strategic communication based on game theory with boundedly rational agent models
| Project/Area Number |
20530164
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Tama University |
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Principal Investigator |
TAKIZAWA Hirokazu Tama University, 経済学部, 教授 (80297720)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KAWAGOE Toshiji 公立はこだて未来大学, システム情報学科, 准教授 (80272277)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2010
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 経済理論 / ゲーム理論 / コミュニケーション / 限定合理性 |
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| Research Abstract |
We studied people's actual behavior in communication with conflicting interests, using tools developed in game theory with boundedly rational agents. We focused on level-k model, which introduces hierarchy of rationality and tries to explain experimental data by the behavior of agents with relatively lower level of rationality. We find that, in cheap-talk game with private information as well as in centipede games, level-k model outperforms other models in explanatory power.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(35 results)
