Theoretical and Experimental Study of Whistlebrower Protection Act and Corporation Compliance
| Project/Area Number |
20530246
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Future University-Hakodate |
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Principal Investigator |
KAWAGOE Toshiji Future University-Hakodate, システム情報科学部, 准教授 (80272277)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TAKIZAWA Hirokazu 中央大学, 経済学部, 教授 (80297720)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2010
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | 公益通報者保護 / コンプライアンス / ゲーム理論 / 実験経済学 |
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| Research Abstract |
Whistlebrower Protection Act was investigated by game theory and economic experiment. A whistlebrower has motive to report an unjust conduct in a corporation for social justice and consumer's benefit. On the other hand, he will be doubted his royalty for the corporation and is given a label as a traitor. So we modeled such a whistlebrower's behavior by guilt aversion theory. We then extended the theory toward a theory of collective guilt responsibility.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(25 results)
