Incentive contracts under long-term relationship
| Project/Area Number |
20730131
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Nagoya University |
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Principal Investigator |
HANAZONO Makoto 名古屋大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (60362406)
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| Research Collaborator |
WATANABE Yasutora ノースウェスタン大学, ケロッグ経営大学院, 助教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 長期的関係 / 関係的契約 / インセンティブ / 情報 / 交渉 / 情報の集約 / 金融契約 |
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| Research Abstract |
Among the points pertaining to incentive contracts under long-term relationship, I find the conditions under which the transaction cost arises due to contracting parties' asymmetric information. The key is the accuracy of information about the profitability of the project to be contracted upon and the time preference in the bargaining for contract agreement. In particular, the transaction cost due to inefficient agreement becomes relatively higher if the accuracy is medium and the time preference is not so high. Also, I show that as the accuracy improves, the agreement approaches to the efficient one and therefore the transaction cost is becoming smaller.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(8 results)
