Dynamic political economy analysis of environmental and social security policies
| Project/Area Number |
20730208
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
ONO Tetsuo 大阪大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (50305661)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 政治経済学 / 社会保障 / 所得再分配 / 高齢化 / 国債 / 年金 / マルコフ均衡 / 世代重複モデル / 公共財供給 / 世代内再分配 / 世代間再分配 / 環境政策 / 政治経済均衡 / 公共財 / 環境 / 借入制約 / 退職 / 所得階層移動 / 世代間再配分 / 世代内再配分 |
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| Research Abstract |
The purpose of this study is to analyze the politics of environmental and social security policies in the presence of intra-generational and inter-generational conflicts of interests. The analysis leads to the following results. First, there are multiple political equilibria. Which equilibrium arises depends on the expectations of agents. Second, low-income agents prefer a low, rather than a high tax burden when they have hope of upward mobility in the future. Third, the intergenerational conflict over environmental and social security policies results in an inefficient allocation in terms of environmental quality and old-age social security.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(21 results)
