| Project/Area Number |
20730214
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Oita University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
IDA Tomoya Oita University, 経済学部, 准教授 (50315313)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2010
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥260,000 (Direct Cost: ¥200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥60,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 国際租税競争 / 内生的手番決定 / 国際的二重課税 / 戦略的代替 / 戦略的補完 / First-mover advantage / Second-mover advantage / 外国直接投資 / 先手優位 / 後手優位 / 戦略的代替性 / 戦略的補完性 / 課税原則 / 直接投資 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
This study examines endogenous timing in an international tax competition model. Unlike existing studies, governments are assumed to decide not only tax rates but also whether they are set early or late. The Nash equilibrium provides three conclusions for alternative double tax allowances. First, tax deductions cause simultaneous tax competition, whereas tax credits yield sequential tax competition. Second, any tax rules would generate capital trade. Third, one country is better off but another is worse off with credits than deductions.
|
