| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This study investigated the relationship between the ownership structure featuring the Japanese corporate system and the accounting information in several aspects. The key to dealing with this issue is to understand the principal factors which characterize the algebraic function of the market value and which accurately reflect the differentiated preferences of market participants. In this attempt, three findings are derived. First, accounting information is systematically skewed in the presence of irrational traders because managers fully acknowledge the fact that the market value substantially reflects the effect of noise trader risk. These irrational traders may encompass corporate and/or bank equity ownership for the purpose of tightening business relationship. Second, the use of valuation formulae such as residual income model needs caveat when the market price is subject to a temporal abnormal variance relative to the specified level shown by the variance-bounds test. Third, and most importantly, the optimal disclosure policy of supply chain in which the downstream firms compete in a duopoly market is considered. In this setting the backward ownership of downstream firms is crucial in that upstream firms optimally choose full disclosure about their input prices.
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