Project/Area Number |
20K19798
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Review Section |
Basic Section 60070:Information security-related
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Research Institution | The University of Electro-Communications |
Principal Investigator |
Li Yang 電気通信大学, 大学院情報理工学研究科, 准教授 (20821812)
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Project Period (FY) |
2020-04-01 – 2024-03-31
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Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2023)
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Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2023: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2022: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2021: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2020: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
|
Keywords | side-channel attack / screaming channel / AES / Side-Channel Attack / Range SCA / IoT Devices / Key Recovery / IoT / Distance |
Outline of Research at the Start |
This research will conduct a security evaluation of distance side-channel attacks for network-enabled devices for the Internet of Things, to reveal the leakage mechanism, to understand the relations between close attacks and distance attacks, and to propose reasonable countermeasures.
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Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this study, we established an environment to investigate the leakage characteristics of electromagnetic side-channel attacks known as screaming channels, which can recover secret key of IoT device from a long distance . Using profiling techniques for analysis, we gained new general insights into the leakage characteristics. Furthermore, we developed a new attack method that does not require profiling unlike previous works. Compared to traditional attack methods, this new approach has been proven to reduce the amount of measurements needed for key recovery. As part of the attack methodology, we proposed a combined attack by integrating different leakage channels. Finally, in this study, we partially modified the assembly code of the cryptographic implementation to investigate how these changes affect leakage characteristics for screaming channels.
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Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
本研究は,物理的アクセスの制約を克服したscreaming channels攻撃の漏洩特性を研究した.遠距離からでもIoTデバイスのセキュリティを脅かすscreaming channels攻撃の実際の安全性脅威をより正確に評価し,防御策の開発を促進する.また,安全なデバイス設計のための基準を提供し,社会全体のデジタルセキュリティ意識の向上に寄与する.学術的には,新しい漏洩モデルと攻撃手法の提案が暗号解析分野に新たな視点をもたらす.
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