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Implementation problems with irrational agents under the repeated setting

Research Project

Project/Area Number 20K22110
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Review Section 0107:Economics, business administration, and related fields
Research InstitutionOsaka University of Economics

Principal Investigator

Hagiwara Makoto  大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (20875116)

Project Period (FY) 2020-09-11 – 2023-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2022)
Budget Amount *help
¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2021: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2020: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Keywordsメカニズムデザイン / ソロモン王のジレンマ / 資源配分問題 / 再交渉 / 制度設計 / 遂行問題 / ナッシュプログラム / 繰り返し環境 / 遂行理論
Outline of Research at the Start

本研究では,「遂行問題」を分析する.遂行問題とは,制度設計者が人々の戦略的虚偽の可能性を考慮して,ある社会目標を遂行する「メカニズム」を設計しようとする問題である.この問題は,オークション問題や学校選択問題,公共財配分問題など多くの例を含んでいる.多くの遂行理論の先行研究では,人々が合理的であり,かつ1度だけで終わる場合にのみ焦点を当てていた.しかし,現実的にそのような状況は多くない.本研究では,非合理的な個人が存在するときに,同じ社会目標を毎期繰り返し遂行できるのは,社会目標がどのような性質を満たしている時かを分析する.

Outline of Final Research Achievements

The following three studies are conducted.
The first is a theoretical study on the problem of allocating a perfectly divisible good with renegotiation. The study proposes a new game to strategically justify the constrained equal awards rule. The second is a study to characterize how social goals can be achieved when each of the two equilibrium concepts represents agents' behavior under incomplete information. The third is an experimental study of King Solomon's dilemma which is considered the problem of allocating an indivisible good. In the study, the existence of bounded rational individuals is allowed. A performance comparison of the two mechanisms is analyzed.

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

従来の権利付き完全分割財配分問題に関する研究では,1期においてのみ考えていた.しかし,現実的には1期だけでなく,同じ問題が繰り返し起こることが多い.この点に関して,1度だけで交渉が終わるのではなく,再交渉を許すゲームを用いて理論研究を進めた点に学術的意義がある.
従来の遂行問題に関する研究では,誰もが自身の好みを最大限満たすように行動できると仮定してきた. しかし,そのような行動を目指しても上手くできない限定合理的な個人が多く観察されてきた.この点を考慮した上で実験研究を進め,理論で考えられてきたメカニズムよりも性能が良いメカニズムを設計・観察した点に,学術的意義がある.

Report

(4 results)
  • 2022 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2021 Research-status Report
  • 2020 Research-status Report
  • Research Products

    (3 results)

All 2023 2022 2020

All Journal Article (3 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 3 results)

  • [Journal Article] King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies2023

    • Author(s)
      Hagiwara Makoto、Yonekura Fumihiro
    • Journal Title

      Review of Economic Design

      Volume: - Issue: 1 Pages: 1-19

    • DOI

      10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8

    • Related Report
      2022 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values2022

    • Author(s)
      Hagiwara Makoto
    • Journal Title

      The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

      Volume: - Issue: 2 Pages: 663-678

    • DOI

      10.1515/bejte-2021-0115

    • Related Report
      2022 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game2020

    • Author(s)
      Hagiwara Makoto、Hanato Shunsuke
    • Journal Title

      Theory and Decision

      Volume: 90 Issue: 2 Pages: 233-243

    • DOI

      10.1007/s11238-020-09782-0

    • Related Report
      2020 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed

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Published: 2020-09-29   Modified: 2024-01-30  

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