| Project/Area Number |
21500068
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Computer system/Network
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| Research Institution | University of Tsukuba |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
LI Jie 筑波大学, システム情報系, 教授 (50251046)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
ALTMAN Eitan フランス共和国国立情報, 自動制御研究所, 一級研究部長
POURTALLIER Odile フランス共和国国立情報, 自動制御研究所, 研究員
TOUATI Corinne フランス共和国国立情報, 自動制御研究所, 研究員
REGRAND Arnaud フランス共和国国立情報, 自動制御研究所, 研究員
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009-04-01 – 2014-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | トラフィックエンジニアリング / 独立分散管理 / 情報通信工学 / ゲーム理論 / 情報ネットワーク / 計算機システム / 負荷均衡 / 経路選択 / 分散情報管理 / ネットワーク / 分散システム / 特報通信工学 / 独立分機管理 |
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| Research Abstract |
Information networks and distributed systems are shared by a number of independent users and organizations who may be independent/noncooperative decision makers. It may be expected that the entire performance of the networks will be guided to overall improvement, if each decision maker pursues its own performance objective unilaterally by means of the noncooperative decisions. In addition, it is anticipated that mutual independent decision making, i.e. noncooperative optimization may bring about the `fair' situations such that all decision makers may receive worse benefits than some other ways of decision making may do, as exemplified by the prisoners' dilemma and the Braess paradox. We call them such degradations of utilities 'paradoxes.' That is, the noncoopwerative decision making may be Pareto inefficient. In this study, we have searched the scheme that may be Pareto efficient but may reflect the fairness of the noncoopertive decision making.
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