| Project/Area Number |
21530168
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
SUEHIRO Hideo 神戸大学, 経営学研究科, 教授 (30162837)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
KOBAYASHI Hajime 関西大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (10347510)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / シグナリング / リーダーシップ |
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| Research Abstract |
With a game theoretic model, we studied how a probability with which a member of a team takes a leadership behavior in team production differs depending on his informational ability with which he forms his assessment of team productivity. We studied the sequential equilibrium in a team with symmetric informational abilities and in a team with asymmetric informational abilities. We found that(1) there exists a sequential equilibrium both in a symmetric ability team and in an asymmetric ability team,(2) there may exist multiple sequential equilibria both in a symmetric ability team and in an asymmetric ability team, and(3) it is not necessarily the case that a probability of taking a leadership behavior is increased when his/her informational ability is improved.
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