| Project/Area Number |
21530169
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Metropolitan University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
YAMASHITA Hideaki 首都大学東京, 社会科学研究科, 教授 (30200687)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
MATSUI Tomomi 中央大学, 理工学部, 教授 (30270888)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / オークション / リアルオプション / 優モジュラ関数 |
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| Research Abstract |
In this research, we obtained the following two results. First of all, we provide the sufficient conditions for a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies to exist for a class of stochastic games with finite horizon, in which any stage game has strategic complementarities. Secondly, we investigated a game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market. The incumbent privately knows the information and has an incentive to delay the timing of the investment in order to hide the information strategically. We characterize the equilibria of this signaling game and give the conditions in which the social welfare is distorted.
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