| Project/Area Number |
21530170
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Keio University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KAWAMATA Kunio 帝京大学, 経済学部, 教授 (30051569)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
YAMAGATA Ryuji 東邦大学, 理学部, 准教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
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| Keywords | ネットワーク / リンク形成 / コネクション / ゲーム理論 / 組織構造 / リンク / プラットフォーム / ネットワーク外部性 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
(1) In the article "Effects of Players 'Asymmetry on a Network Formation", we introduce players' asymmetry into the network formation problem. Based on both theoretical and simulation based analyses, we study the effects of concavity and convexity of link value functions on the efficiency and stability of networks.(2) In the article "Delegating the Decision-Making Authority to Terminate a Sequential Project", we considers the optimal allocation of decision-making authority within firm network, when a project requires two-stage sequential investments to be made by different agents.
The optimal structure is determined by whether the stopping opportunity is important or not.
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