Mechanism design of matching agreements on global environmental issues
Project/Area Number |
21530226
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Applied economics
|
Research Institution | Kyushu University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
|
Keywords | 国際環境協定 / マッチング / ゲーム理論 |
Research Abstract |
I have extended my own previous researches concerning the effectiveness of matching agreements on global environmental issues in two directions. First, in the case of asymmetric countries, there exists a matching rule where the efficient agreement is self-enforcing just as the symmetric case. Second, the efficiency and the self-enforcement can be satisfied at the same time when we consider the interdependencies between the actions of signatories and those of non-signatories by allowing the existence of countries that do not commit to the matching. Thus, matching agreements have turned out to be effective in more realistic frameworks
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(13 results)