| Project/Area Number |
21530243
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Kwansei Gakuin University |
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Principal Investigator |
MIZUNO Keizo 関西学院大学, 商学部, 教授 (40229703)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MATSUSHIMA Noriaki 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (80334879)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
TAKII Katsuya 大阪大学, 国際公共政策研究科, 准教授 (70346138)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Keywords | ユニバーサル・サービス規制 / 戦略的インフラ投資 / 接続料金規制 / 接続スピルオーバー効果 / サービス・ベース企業 / 施設ベース企業 / 接続スピルオーバー / ビジネス置き換え効果 / 接続による戦略効果 / ネットワーク / インフラ整備 / ユニバーサル・サービス / インフラ・ベース企業 / インフラ建設 / 企業間提携 / 接続 / 民営化 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research examines the effect of regulation and a firm's strategic behavior on infrastructure penetration and market structures in network industries. We obtain two main analytical results. First, a dynamic analysis shows that universal service obligation induces the delay of infrastructure penetration, which in turn implies the enhancement of inequality among customers. Second, the strategic investment behavior of an infrastructure owner can distort access regulation, and it also induces overuse of a bypass(i. e., underuse of access) from a welfare perspective.
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