Positive Research on Managerial Compensation and Corporate Performance-Using Pay for Directors as a proxy to build effective explanation models
Project/Area Number |
21530491
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Accounting
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Research Institution | Tezukayama University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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Keywords | コーポレート・ガバナンス / 経営者報酬 / 役員報酬 / 企業成果 / 株価連動型報酬 / ストック・オプション / パネル・データ分析 / 大株主 / クロスセクショナル解析 / 代理変数 / 開示 / パネル分析 |
Research Abstract |
So far as remuneration, such as salaries and bonuses, are still low in our country comparatively to western countries, it is hard to assume that remuneration systems are westernized immediately to improve corporate governance. The simultaneous equation model to explain the relations between managerial compensation and corporate performance has higher statistical power than [1] a simple regression model directors 'remuneration to corporate-performance with time(1 term) lag, [2]' equity holdings(by such as an overseas corporation ratio)' has strongest relevancies with executive remuneration, and [3] executive remuneration has positive correlation with' price earning per-share ratio (PER or the rate of change)' among the stock-price related indexes, and that there was positive correlation between'(logarithmic transformed) gross-assets', 'return on equity(ROE)', and there were negative correlation with 'debt ratio' among accounting indexes. Furthermore, in order to heighten explanation power, by one side acquisition not only in rather easily obtainable accounting digital data or stock price related data(to clarify the heterogeneity between companies). In addition, the other variables (ex. an officer's age, tenure-of-office years, and numbers, a free cash flow), and using a suitable (although it must probably refrain from abuse) dummy variable etc. will also demand careful thought. Moreover, probably, on the other hand, there is very much room for reexamination in using average remuneration per director as an explained variable("management-remuneration"proxy variable).
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
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[Presentation] M & A in a Wonderland-JAPAN2009
Author(s)
Junjiro Miyamoto
Organizer
Seminar of Prof.Pedersen, Corporate Governance Institute in Copenhagen Business School
Place of Presentation
Copenhagen Business School(DENMARK)
Year and Date
2009-06-23
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