Modeling of MAC Protocols Based on Incomplete Information Games and Countermeasures against Selfish Users
| Project/Area Number |
21560408
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Communication/Network engineering
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Okayama Prefectural University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TAKETSUGU Jumpei 岡山県立大学, 情報工学部, 助教 (10405483)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 移動体通信 / 情報通信工学 / ネットワーク / ゲーム理論 / 非協力ゲーム / 通信プロトコル / 利己的行動 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
In a random access network, a node generally controls its packet transmission according to the specified backoff algorithm. Some nodes may disobey the backoff algorithm and behave selfishly in order to obtain more bandwidth share. We consider a scenario where a new node is ready to join a slotted ALOHA-type random access network and has to decide whether he should behave honestly or selfishly without the knowledge of the number of selfish nodes in the network. Numerical results indicate that selfish behavior is not always amply rewarded and that it provides a selfish node with less payoff than honest behavior in some cases.
|
Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(27 results)
