| Project/Area Number |
21653016
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
AOYAGI Masaki 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (50314430)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥60,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥260,000 (Direct Cost: ¥200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥60,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥200,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥100,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 外部性 / 集団的戦略的操作不可能性 / 最適メカニズム / 利潤最大化 / 効率性 / 不完備情報 / ネットワーク財 / 戦略的操作不能性 / メカニズム / 戦略的操作不可能性 / 事後的個人合理性 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
For the success of a mechanism, it is important that it is credible in the sense that it leaves no room for the designer to manipulate the outcome after he acquires information. In this project, we studied credibility criteria in(1) a sales mechanism employed by a monopolist seller of a good whose value depends on the aggregate consumption level, and(2) an information policy of a government which determines the quality of its private signal about the risk of a shock and then discloses it to the public to induce their action.
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