| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Research Abstract |
Shapley value is the most popular solution concept in payoff allocation problems. In the real markets, however, there are many firms that use technologies that are not licensed via patent pools, and thus we need to consider the properties of Shapley values for the games with coalition structures because it is more appropriate solution concept for the payoff allocation problem in patent pool. The most important result of this research was, although it is not the analysis of patent pool itself, that we found some situations where the Shapley values for games with coalition structures is not implemented as stable bargaining outcomes. Experiments of auctions and weighted voting were also conducted for a situation where payoff allocation is determined via such mechanisms.
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