Theoretical Analysis on mechanisms of collusion in auctions

Research Project

Project/Area Number	21730200
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Applied economics
Research Institution	Osaka University
Principal Investigator	ISHIBASHI Ikuo 大阪大学, 大学院・国際公共政策研究科, 准教授 (30365035)
Project Period (FY)	2009 – 2012
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
Budget Amount *help	¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000) Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Keywords	経済理論 / 経済政策 / 産業組織論 / 競争政策
Research Abstract	We collected data on collusive behaviors in auctions which are found and judged guilty by Japan Fair Trade Commission. Focusing on important items in economic theory and empirical analysis, we constructed a database from the data. We found that collusive mechanisms in the real world are much simpler than we expected. These results are summarized in a paper and it was published in one of the established international academic journal, the Japan and the World Economy.

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(5 results)