Study on people's risk attitude againstfines
Project/Area Number |
21730231
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic policy
|
Research Institution | Nagoya City University |
Principal Investigator |
HAMAGUCHI Yasuyo 名古屋市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (70399038)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2012
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
|
Keywords | ペナルティ・リスク・法令遵守 / 実験経済学 / ペナルティ / リスク / 法令遵守 / プロスペクト理論 |
Research Abstract |
My co-author and I construct and analyse a simple model of duopoly pricing, competition policy and leniency programmes, and find that within the model, leniency programmes do have an indeterminate effect on collusion. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in the U.K. and in Japan in which human subjects play the role of firms in our model. We compare two leniency programmes - full immunity from fines and partial immunity - with a baseline where no leniency programme is in place.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(8 results)