Mechanism design in fair allocation problems
Project/Area Number |
21830090
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology (2010) Tokyo Metropolitan University (2009) |
Principal Investigator |
HOSHINO Yuji (FUJINAKA Yuji) 東京工業大学, 大学院・社会理工学研究科, 助教 (20552277)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2010
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥1,755,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,350,000、Indirect Cost: ¥405,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥832,000 (Direct Cost: ¥640,000、Indirect Cost: ¥192,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥923,000 (Direct Cost: ¥710,000、Indirect Cost: ¥213,000)
|
Keywords | メカニズムデザイン / ナッシュ遂行 / 耐戦略性 / 公平分担問題 / 非分割財 / 誘因両立性 |
Research Abstract |
In this project, I studied mechanisms that implement fair allocations in the problem of allocating indivisible goods with monetary transfers, which are referred to as the fair allocation problems. Concretely, I investigated properties of a simple mechanism in the problem with a single object. Next, in the problem where there are multiple indivisible objects, I examined which welfare level each participant to a mechanism can obtain by maximally manipulating the mechanism. This analysis leads to various meaningful results on mechanisms in this problem.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(15 results)