Research Project
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
This study investigates a legislative bargaining model in which the rejecter in the previous round becomes the proposer in the current round. We allow the time and risk preferences to differ across players and the voting quota to be a supermajority or submajority. We show that there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that each player's equilibrium payoff conditional on being a proposer is unique, and we explicitly derive the equilibria and equilibrium payoff. We compare a proposer's equilibrium payoff when the time interval between two consecutive rounds tends to zero with respect to the protocols of the selection of proposers and the voting quota.
All 2013 2009
All Journal Article (1 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 1 results) Presentation (2 results)
Social Choice and Welfare
Volume: 40 Issue: 1 Pages: 27-40
10.1007/s00355-011-0567-9