| Budget Amount *help |
¥7,670,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,770,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Major shareholders are to be regulated on the exercising of their shareholders’ rights or influencing their invested company according to both corporate law and soft law. Ｃontrolling shareholders should conduct in related-party transactions in principle, according to the arm’s length test and subject to the appropriate disclosure requirements, in order to protect minority shareholders and the creditors of its subsidiaries. Major investment shareholders should exercise their shareholders’ rights appropriately, in order to enhance corporate governance of their invested company. On the other hand, investment shareholders should not impede the enhancement of corporate value from the mid-to-long term by engagement with the management and exercising of voting rights at shareholders' meetings. For these purposes, the strategy and conduct of institutional investors should be disclosed and evaluated in the markets according to soft law, such as Japan’s Stewardship Code, not corporate law.
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