| Budget Amount *help |
¥19,240,000 (Direct Cost: ¥14,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥4,440,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We analyzed strategy-proof rules in various model such as public alternative models, private goods allocation models, matching models, etc. Here, strategy-proofness means that society members have incentive to reveal their true private information, that is, it is a dominant strategy for each agent to reveal his true preference. Especially, we showed that (i) the minimum price Walrasian rule is the unique rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) the outcome of the simultaneous ascending auction coincides the allocation given by the minimum price Walrasian rule. The simultaneous ascending auction is employed in many countries to allocate frequency licenses. Our analysis supports this auction.
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