| Project/Area Number |
22500008
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Fundamental theory of informatics
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| Research Institution | The University of Electro-Communications |
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Principal Investigator |
SAKIYAMA Kazuo 電気通信大学, 大学院・情報理工学研究科, 准教授 (80508838)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OHTA Kazuo 電気通信大学, 大学院・情報理工学研究科, 教授 (80333491)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
IWAMOTO Mitsugu 電気通信大学, 先端領域教育研究センター, 特任准教授 (50377016)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2012
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Keywords | 暗号・認証等 / 情報システム / セキュア・コンピューティング / 証明可能安全性 / サイドチャネル解析 / 情報理論的安全性 / ＰＵＦ / PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) / セキュア・コンピューテング / PUF(Physical Unclonable Function) |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
Side-channel attacks are methods, where attackers retrieve secret information by using physical phenomena leaked from cryptographic hardware such as power consumption and electromagnetic radiation. Exploring the attack limits of side-channel analysis, this research focused on the clarification of information leakage. We succeeded in deriving the theoretical bound for the amount of information leakage, and extended the understanding of the relationship between secret and random information handled in cryptology.
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