| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We formulate a duopoly model in which firms care about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigate the relation between the degree of competitiveness and R&D expenditure. When the duopoly market is less competitive or much competitive, R&D activities are intensified. We also investigate the relationship between competition and privatization policies. We find that under quadratic production costs, which is popular in this field, the optimal degree of privatization is higher when the market competition is less tough, in contrast to the results in the literature. However, this result is reversed under constant marginal costs. Finally, we solve the multi-store paradox by introducing interdependent payoff between the firms. We show that firms set up multiple stores unless the degree of payoff interdependence is low. We also show that multiple equilibria, intertwined and neighboring location equilibria, exist if the degree of payoff interdependence is intermediate.
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