A Study of Relative Profit Maximization Approach
| Project/Area Number |
22530175
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 相対利潤 / 競争度 / イノベーション / 混合寡占 / 民営化 / 多店舗パラドックス / 立地競争 / カルテル / 相対利潤最大化 / 競争構造 / 企業の社会的責任 / endogenus timing / 自由参入市場 / Multi-Store Paradox / 相対評価 / 製品差別化 / 税の超過負担 / 民営化中立定理 / 研究開発 / 競争政策 / relative performance / competitiveness / timing game / collusion / Hotelling / R&D / spatial Cournot / price leadership / spatial agglomeration / evolution / R and D / Bertrand competition / cost asymmetry / mixed oligopoly / free entry |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We formulate a duopoly model in which firms care about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigate the relation between the degree of competitiveness and R&D expenditure. When the duopoly market is less competitive or much competitive, R&D activities are intensified. We also investigate the relationship between competition and privatization policies. We find that under quadratic production costs, which is popular in this field, the optimal degree of privatization is higher when the market competition is less tough, in contrast to the results in the literature. However, this result is reversed under constant marginal costs. Finally, we solve the multi-store paradox by introducing interdependent payoff between the firms. We show that firms set up multiple stores unless the degree of payoff interdependence is low. We also show that multiple equilibria, intertwined and neighboring location equilibria, exist if the degree of payoff interdependence is intermediate.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(50 results)
