An analysis on emissions trading with forward and spot markets under oligopolistic competition
| Project/Area Number |
22530220
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies |
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Principal Investigator |
TANAKA Makoto 政策研究大学院大学, 政策研究科, 教授 (10377137)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010-04-01 – 2014-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | 環境政策 / 排出権取引 / 寡占競争 / 先渡し市場 / スポット市場 |
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| Research Abstract |
Tradable allowances have received considerable attention in recent years. One emerging issue is their interaction with electricity markets. This paper extends the model of Allaz and Vila (1993) by incorporating emissions trading with forward and spot markets for electricity. We focus on the effects of strategic forward position and initial allowances allocation on the equilibrium outcomes. We find that firms with a dirty portfolio would have stronger incentives to take a long position in the forward market to raise the electricity price. Increasing the amount of allowances assigned to clean firms leads to a reduction in electricity and allowance prices.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(16 results)
