| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Research Abstract |
Our study examines the relevance of different work incentive models by distinguishingreciprocity induced by pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors. The literature does not present an examination of different models all together but rather specifically examines each model mainly through experimental laboratory games. By using survey data, we study which models are suitable to explain work incentives in real labor markets. The results show that overall the non-pecuniary reciprocity model explains work incentives well. Additionally, the shirking model induces effort only if employees face a high level of vulnerability to firing and the high level of vulnerability to dismissal invalidates the pecuniary gift exchange and non-pecuniary reciprocity models. These results can complement controlled laboratory experiments, since their results are often restrictedin applying to the reality.
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