| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Research Abstract |
I could point out the following facts and analysis on the characteristics and problemsof Japanese cabinet system as a result of comparative study with British and Germancabinet system.
The Japanese Prime Minister has not been considered to be superior to other members in managing the Cabinet, although it is clear that the PM is located insuperior status to other Ministers of State in organization principles. In relation withthe central departments, it has been often pointed out that the main issue is the interpretation of the Article 72 of the Japanese Constitution 1946: the PM can onlysuggest each department without any Cabinet decisions. However, in this point, the PM’s power is not different from the British Prime Minister or German Kanzler. What has caused one of serious problems in the Japanese government, sectionalism ofdepartments, might be that the PM (or the Cabinet) has neither the power ofdepartments reorganisation nor the power of senior civil service appointments, ratherthan lack of the power of direction with legal force.
leadership in managing the Cabinet, as the structuralinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution, due to the superior status in shaping the Cabinet; “departments’ sectionalism” shall not be based on the Japanese Constitution principles. Therefore, the rules relating to department (re)organization and personnel power of senior civil service, which might have brought the “departments’ sectionalism” , should be reconsidered.
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