Designing practical mechanisms for indivisible good allocation
| Project/Area Number |
22730158
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Keio University (2011)
Yokohama National University (2010) |
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Principal Investigator |
SAKAI Toyotaka 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (50404976)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | メカニズムデザイン / 社会的選択 / 非分割財 / 耐戦略性 / 公平性 / 世代間公平 |
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| Research Abstract |
In indivisible good economies such as auction or matching, we studied the problem of designing economic mechanisms。For example, in an auction model without the quasi-linearity assumption on preferences, we offered an(axiomatic) characterization of second price auctions on the basis of equity and strategy-proofness。Furthermore, we characterized a rule that is stable and one-sided strategy-proof rule in a matching model。We also characterized the uniform rule on the basis of a weak version of strategy-proofness in allotment economies。In our discussions, we weakened various assumptions or conditions to obtain practical mechanisms.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(13 results)
