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Equilibrium Coordination in the Implementation Problem: Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?

Research Project

Project/Area Number 22730160
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionAoyama Gakuin University

Principal Investigator

MIZUKAMI Hideki  青山学院大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (30377238)

Project Period (FY) 2010 – 2012
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
Budget Amount *help
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Keywordsゲーム理論 / 遂行理論 / メカニズム・デザイン / 経済理論 / 行動メカニズム・デザイン / ナッシュ遂行 / 均衡調整問題 / 正直均衡
Research Abstract

In implementation theory, it does not matter from the theoretical viewpoint that the designed mechanism has multiple equilibria, since those equilibrium outcomes coincide with the social goal by definition. However, when those mechanisms are used in practice, the "equilibrium coordination problem" arises, i.e., how do agents decide which equilibrium to choose among those equilibria. Direct revelation mechanisms, which prevail recently, are simple enough to have multiple equilibria. So, it is an important problem to solve the equilibrium coordination problem. This study shows by economic experiments that in a direct revelation mechanism, if the mechanism which has multiple equilibria has the truth-telling equilibrium, the equilibrium is salient among thoseequilibria. This implies that the truth-telling equilibrium could become a focal point (Schelling (1960)).

Report

(4 results)
  • 2012 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2011 Annual Research Report
  • 2010 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (2 results)

All 2012 2010

All Journal Article (1 results) Presentation (1 results)

  • [Journal Article] Ex-Post Self-Implementation2012

    • Author(s)
      Mizukami, H. and T. Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      SSRN eLibrary

      Pages: 1-10

    • URL

      http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2164972

    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?: An Experiment on Direct Nash Implementation2010

    • Author(s)
      水上英貴
    • Organizer
      学内研究会
    • Place of Presentation
      青山学院大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-11-24
    • Related Report
      2010 Annual Research Report

URL: 

Published: 2010-08-23   Modified: 2019-07-29  

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