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On possibility of constructing social choice functions which are nonmanipulable by preferences adjacent to the sincere ones

Research Project

Project/Area Number 22730167
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionFukuoka University

Principal Investigator

SATO Shin  福岡大学, 経済学部, 講師 (60458924)

Project Period (FY) 2010 – 2011
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
Budget Amount *help
¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Keywordsミクロ経済学 / 社会的選択 / 耐戦略性 / 耐隣接操作性
Research Abstract

The possibility of constructing rules which do not give agents an incentive to misreport information on preferences in social choices is one of the most important topics in microeconomics. In this research, I propose a new property of rules, called"AM-proofness", which prevents agents from misreporting their preferences, and find logical relationship to"strategy-proofness"which has played a central role in the earlier researches.

Report

(3 results)
  • 2011 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2010 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (10 results)

All 2011 2010 Other

All Journal Article (1 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 1 results) Presentation (6 results) Remarks (3 results)

  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies : The case of weak orders2011

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 40 Issue: 2 Pages: 479-494

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-011-0616-4

    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report 2011 Final Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2011

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Organizer
      The 7th Biannual Conference on Economic Design, University of Montreal
    • Place of Presentation
      カナダ
    • Year and Date
      2011-06-15
    • Related Report
      2011 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2011

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      7th Biannual Conference on Economic Design
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Montreal,カナダ
    • Year and Date
      2011-06-15
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2010

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Organizer
      Hitotsubashi G-COE Lectures and Workshop on Choice
    • Place of Presentation
      一橋大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-10-23
    • Related Report
      2011 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2010

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      Hitotsubashi G-COE Lectures and Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      一橋大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-10-23
    • Related Report
      2010 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] Adjacent manipulation2010

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会2010年度春季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      千葉大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-06-06
    • Related Report
      2011 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] Adjacent manipulation2010

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会
    • Place of Presentation
      千葉大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-06-06
    • Related Report
      2010 Annual Research Report
  • [Remarks]

    • URL

      http://sites.google.com/site/shinsatoecon/research

    • Related Report
      2011 Final Research Report
  • [Remarks]

    • URL

      http://sites.google.com/site/shinsatoecon/research

    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Remarks]

    • URL

      http://sites.google.com/site/shinsatoecon/research

    • Related Report
      2010 Annual Research Report

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Published: 2010-08-23   Modified: 2016-04-21  

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