Empirical analysis on collusion in public auctions

Research Project

Project/Area Number	22730204
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Applied economics
Research Institution	Shiga University (2012-2015) Tokyo Metropolitan University (2010-2011)
Principal Investigator	Ishii Rieko 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (40456918)
Project Period (FY)	2010-04-01 – 2016-03-31
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
Budget Amount *help	¥5,460,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,260,000) Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2014: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000) Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Keywords	応用計量経済学 / 入札 / 競争政策 / 公共入札 / 入札談合
Outline of Final Research Achievements	We investigated data from Japanese public auctions in order to see the effect of the market environment, the change in the auction system, and the existence of collusion on the bidding behavior. It is found that (1) bids are more rounded under collusion, (2) the bids are lower and the cancellation of submitting bids after the entry increases in online procurement auctions compared to the traditional auctions, and (3) the bidders are relatively symmetric in less competitive auctions.