| Project/Area Number |
22730242
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Fukuoka University |
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Principal Investigator |
NAKAMURA Yui 福岡大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (70465714)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2012
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Keywords | 情報の非対称性 / 貧困削減 / ワークフェア / セルフセレクション / 有給休暇 / 労 働のインセンティブ / 最適課税制度 / 貧困削減政策 / 所得再分配 / 現金給付 / 労働のインセンティブ / 現金支給 / 余剰分析 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
When a government makes cash transfers as a part of a poverty alleviation program, it often faces a screening problem in identifying those individuals who most deserve to be supported financially because individual productivity levels cannot be monitored. Several self-selection mechanisms have been proven to be able to overcome this screening problem. However, especially in developing countries, it is often difficult for the government to observe individual income. I thus propose a mechanism that enables cash transfers to support deserving individuals, even though individual income levels cannot be monitored. Moreover, the proposed system allows the government to obtain the necessary financial resources by collecting taxation from productive individuals.
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