| Project/Area Number |
22730254
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | 国際教養学部 (2012)
Akita International University (2010-2011) |
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Principal Investigator |
YEH Tsung-ming 国際教養学部, 国際教養学部, 准教授 (20404858)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2012
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | 企業金融 / 企業統治 / 機関投資家 / ファンド / メインバンク / 企業買収 / 株主提案 / ガバナンス / 買収 / 企業価値 / プライベートエクイティ / LBO |
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| Research Abstract |
Main banks used to play the most important role in monitoring Japanese companies. However, as main banking system began to weaken since the late 1990s, institutional investors are becoming active in the Japanese corporate governance. This research project analyzed the economic costs and benefits associated with institutional investors, followed by empirical studies on buyouts and shareholder proposals undertaken by funds in corporate Japanese. The empirical results, in general, provide positive evidence that shareholder activism undertaken by funds can mitigate managerial entrenchment and therefore enhance firm value. In the same time, funds may have their own governance problems. Case studies and economic analysis suggest that heavier punishment is more effective than stricter disclosure requirements for funds.
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