Coalitional game analysis of surplus distribution problems in open and anonymous environments
| Project/Area Number |
22830101
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
KONGO Takumi 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手 (70579664)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2011
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,261,000 (Direct Cost: ¥970,000、Indirect Cost: ¥291,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥741,000 (Direct Cost: ¥570,000、Indirect Cost: ¥171,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
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| Keywords | 提携型ゲーム / 公理的特徴付け / 配分問題 |
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| Research Abstract |
This project studies surplus division problems focusing on an environment where agents can freely participate and leave, and where participants are not easily identified. Typical examples of such an environment are transactions over the Internet. A unified characterization of several surplus distributions(solutions of coalitional/cooperative games) is given by focusing on "agents' collusion behaviors by using a common ID" and on "influence of an agent's leaving on the payoffs of the remaining agents.This result gives us one criterion of selecting an appropriate surplus distribution rule among several ones, as the situation demands.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(3 results)
