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Coalitional game analysis of surplus distribution problems in open and anonymous environments

Research Project

Project/Area Number 22830101
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionWaseda University

Principal Investigator

KONGO Takumi  早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手 (70579664)

Project Period (FY) 2010 – 2011
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2011)
Budget Amount *help
¥1,261,000 (Direct Cost: ¥970,000、Indirect Cost: ¥291,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥741,000 (Direct Cost: ¥570,000、Indirect Cost: ¥171,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Keywords提携型ゲーム / 公理的特徴付け / 配分問題
Research Abstract

This project studies surplus division problems focusing on an environment where agents can freely participate and leave, and where participants are not easily identified. Typical examples of such an environment are transactions over the Internet. A unified characterization of several surplus distributions(solutions of coalitional/cooperative games) is given by focusing on "agents' collusion behaviors by using a common ID" and on "influence of an agent's leaving on the payoffs of the remaining agents.This result gives us one criterion of selecting an appropriate surplus distribution rule among several ones, as the situation demands.

Report

(3 results)
  • 2011 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2010 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (3 results)

All 2012 2011

All Journal Article (1 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 1 results) Presentation (2 results)

  • [Journal Article] Whose Deletion Does Not Affect Your Payoff? The Difference Between the Shapley Value, the Egalitarian Value, the Solidarity Value, and the Banzhaf Value2012

    • Author(s)
      Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo
    • Journal Title

      European Journal of Operational Research

      Volume: 216(3) Issue: 3 Pages: 638-646

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.ejor.2011.08.011

    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report 2011 Final Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Presentation] Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? the difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the soridality value, and the Banzhaf value?2011

    • Author(s)
      Takumi Kongo
    • Organizer
      Logic, Game Theory, and Social Choice 7
    • Place of Presentation
      ブカレスト(ルーマニア)
    • Year and Date
      2011-07-07
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value?2011

    • Author(s)
      T. Kongo
    • Place of Presentation
      ブカレスト(ルーマニア)
    • Related Report
      2011 Final Research Report

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Published: 2010-08-27   Modified: 2016-04-21  

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