| Project/Area Number |
22K01183
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 05040:Social law-related
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| Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2022-04-01 – 2025-03-31
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| Project Status |
Granted (Fiscal Year 2023)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2024: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2023: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2022: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | competition law / antitrust law / merger control / 独占禁止法 / 競争法 / 企業結合規制 / 問題解消措置 / merger remedies / 民事訴訟法 / Japanese competition law / EU競争法 / 競争政策 / 比較法 |
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| Outline of Research at the Start |
The project focuses on the enforcement of competition law in Japan and the EU. How have competition authorities tackled violations and have their actions been effective? What has been the impact of private lawsuits (so-called private enforcement)?
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| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
My research has challenged the conventional view that merger control in Japan functions in a broadly similar way to other jurisdictions such as the EU. In the article “Merger Control in Japan: In Informal Remedies We Trust”, I calculated the “intervention rate” of the Japan Fair Trade Commission in merger control and compared it with intervention rates in other jurisdiction. The intervention rate is a metric that shows how often competition authorities actually intervene in the mergers that they review (by prohibiting the merger or requiring remedies). To my knowledge, I was the first to conduct such an analysis for Japan. My analysis uncovered a startling truth: the intervention rate in Japan is five times lower than that of the European Commission. It is also significantly lower than the average intervention rate in 65 countries surveyed by the OECD.
I have identified several possible explanations for this and believe the uncovering of this stark divergence contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of competition law enforcement in Japan and the EU. The article also contains findings and comparisons in relation to the informal process used by the JFTC, the frequent use of behavioural remedies, and the lack of court precedents.
I have also written commentaries on several key merger cases in Europe, published an overview of enforcement by national competition authorities in Europe against market sharing cartels, and analysed how competition authorities are tackling the new phenomenon of data spaces.
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| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
With the publication of “Merger Control in Japan: In Informal Remedies We Trust, 18 University of Tokyo Law Review 172-188 (2023)”, which contains an in-depth analysis of the Japan Fair Trade Commission’s actual practice in merger control and a comparison with Europe, an important piece of the planned research was accomplished. In addition, I have analysed the enforcement practice in (market sharing) cartel cases, including by national competition authorities, and made presentations on recent developments regarding competition law enforcement in Europe.
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| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
I plan to continue my analysis, especially in relation to private enforcement of competition law, taking into account recent developments (e.g. the Tabelog case in Japan). In addition, the advent of the Digital Markets Act in the EU, and the possible introduction of a Japanese regulation inspired by the Digital Markets Act, also need to be considered.
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